The Privacy Exposure Problem in Mobile Location-based Services by Wu, Fang-Jing et al.
The Privacy Exposure Problem in Mobile
Location-based Services
Fang-Jing Wu1, Matthias R. Brust3, Yan-Ann Chen4, and Tie Luo2
1NEC Laboratories Europe, Heidelberg, Germany
2Institute for Infocomm Research, A*STAR, Singapore
3Singapore University of Technology and Design, Singapore
4Department of Computer Science, National Chiao Tung University, Taiwan
Abstract—Mobile location-based services (LBSs) empowered
by mobile crowdsourcing provide users with context-aware in-
telligent services based on user locations. As smartphones are
capable of collecting and disseminating massive user location-
embedded sensing information, privacy preservation for mobile
users has become a crucial issue. This paper proposes a metric
called privacy exposure to quantify the notion of privacy, which
is subjective and qualitative in nature, in order to support
mobile LBSs to evaluate the effectiveness of privacy-preserving
solutions. This metric incorporates activity coverage and activity
uniformity to address two primary privacy threats, namely activity
hotspot disclosure and activity transition disclosure. In addition,
we propose an algorithm to minimize privacy exposure for
mobile LBSs. We evaluate the proposed metric and the privacy-
preserving sensing algorithm via extensive simulations. Moreover,
we have also implemented the algorithm in an Android-based
mobile system and conducted real-world experiments. Both our
simulations and experimental results demonstrate that (1) the
proposed metric can properly quantify the privacy exposure
level of human activities in the spatial domain and (2) the
proposed algorithm can effectively cloak users’ activity hotspots
and transitions at both high and low user-mobility levels.
Index Terms—Crowdsourcing, participatory sensing, cyber-
physical systems, data analytics, location-based services, privacy
protection, smart cities.
I. INTRODUCTION
Mobile location-based services (LBSs) [1] exploit loca-
tion information of mobile users to provide context-aware
and personalized services. Mobile crowdsourcing, enabled by
sensor-rich and widely-used smartphones, has further spurred
a wealth of mobile LBSs such as transportation services [2],
lifestyle enhancement systems [3], and localization applica-
tions [4]. Such mobile LBSs highly rely on location-embedded
information from diverse sources such as built-in sensors on
mobile devices, human inputs, and social media [5][6][7]. This
presents significant privacy threats [8] to mobile users. When
they query or contribute data to mobile LBS systems, the
privacy-sensitive information of users might be disclosed to
undesired parties by untrustworthy or poorly-designed back-
end data management systems.
Specifically, the privacy-sensitive information in this paper
includes “activity hotspots” and “activity transitions”. The
former refers to places that a user stays for a long time (e.g.,
home and office) or frequently visits (e.g., a cafe), and the
latter refers to the sequence of those activity hotspots visited
A B
C
Locations Activity hotspots Activity transition 
Front-end users
Privacy-sensitive information
A
B
C
Back-end system
Fig. 1. Privacy-sensitive information in a location-based WiFi advisory
system.
by a user. Fig. 1 illustrates a location-based WiFi advisory
system [9], where a user may query for nearby WiFi access
points with good signal quality, or contributes her quality
of experience (QoE) of WiFi usage to the system. In either
case, the user may unintentionally disclose her home and
office locations as well as the travel path between them.
Such a problem becomes more thorny due to the recent fast
advancement of machine learning and data mining techniques,
where activity hotspots and transitions could be revealed
through statistics and probabilistic models [10][11], and the
“next place” of a user might be inferred [12][13]. Therefore,
privacy preservation for mobile location-based services and
crowdsourcing applications is critical for such system to be
widely and practically adopted.
Given that privacy is largely a subjective and qualitative
notion, this paper proposes to quantify this notion for a set
of location-embedded data submitted by a mobile user, using
a metric called privacy exposure. This metric incorporates
activity coverage and activity uniformity, where the former
refers to the range and the latter refers to the distribution, of a
user’s activity hotspots. For an illustrative example, see Fig. 2,
where the user’s activity coverage in Fig. 2(a) is much smaller
than in Fig. 2(b), while her activity uniformity in Fig. 2(c) is
also much lower than in Fig. 2(b). Both cases (a) and (c) are
prone to disclosing activity hotspots of a user.
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(a) Smaller activity coverage. (b) Larger activity coverage and 
higher activity uniformity.  
(c) Lower activity uniformity. 
Fig. 2. Examples of activity coverage and activity uniformity for different
patterns of activity points in reality.
Secondly, we address the problem of how to minimize
privacy exposure by proposing a privacy-preserving sensing
algorithm to judiciously submit location-embedded data for
each mobile user. Our algorithm (1) exploits ambient network
signatures which are composed of the WiFi BSSIDs or cellular
base station IDs in surroundings, in order to avoid exposing
activity hotspots, and (2) cloaks the activity transitions of
a user using the k-anonymity technique. We also devise a
learning algorithm to learn the hotspots so as to differentiate
between private and non-private locations.
We use extensive simulations to investigate how different
activity patterns affect levels of privacy exposure and how
our k-anonymity-based technique can reduce privacy exposure.
We also implement our privacy-preserving sensing algorithm
in an Android-based mobile system called WiFi-Scout [14]
to evaluate the effectiveness of our proposed metric and
algorithm.
II. RELATED WORK
Preserving location privacy is a critical issue for mobile
LBSs. The work [15] studies how location check-in data in
social networks discloses identity of mobile LBS users. Linear
regression models are exploited in [16] to transform data at the
client side before data is submitted so that user privacy can be
preserved. In [17], a hybrid approach is proposed to preserve
location privacy, where the encryption, data anonymization,
and data obfuscation techniques are adaptively chosen based
on the areas of interest. The work [18] provides users with a
privacy guarantee at the lowest utility loss.
Some k-anonymity approaches [19][20][21] were proposed
to achieve privacy preservation in location-based services.
The work [19] proposes a k-anonymity framework with a
trusted anonymity server which performs location perturbation
on location-embedded queries received from mobile devices
before forwarding these queries to the Mobile LBS provider.
The work [20] considers an entropy-based privacy metric in
the temporal domain so that the query frequency of the real
queried location is similar to that of other dummy locations.
The work [21] deals with k-anonymous location information
in both spatial and temporal domains when making queries
to LBSs. It proposes an algorithm that chooses a sufficiently
large area and delays the query to make k-anonymous queries
if necessary. An entropy-based metric was also used in [22] for
participatory sensing applications. It preserves privacy by dis-
tributing users’ mobility trajectories among multiple databases,
and balancing the frequencies of locations in each individual
database. However, there still lacks a metric for quantifying
privacy exposure particularly in the spatial domain.
Compared with existing research efforts, the key contribu-
tions of this paper are summarized as follows. First, our work
is the first to formally quantify privacy exposure in the spatial
domain for a given set of activity points of an arbitrary user.
The metric is generally defined such that it can be applied to
various mobile LBSs. Second, we formally define the privacy
exposure problem, and propose an algorithm as a solution.
Finally, we evaluate our proposed metric and algorithm via
both simulations and real-world experiments, which confirm
their validity and effectiveness.
III. PROBLEM DEFINITION
A. Countermeasures to Privacy Threats
Multi-modal built-in sensors on smartphones have urged
many mobile LBSs which highly rely on location-embedded
information of users. To explain the privacy threats and how
we can protect user privacy in mobile LBSs, we consider
a WiFi advisory system, WiFi-Scout [4], as an example.
WiFi-Scout relies on crowdsourced WiFi-quality data to help
smartphone users to find nearby WiFi access points (APs) with
good quality. It provides two operating modes, query mode and
crowdsensing mode, for mobile users. The query mode allows
a user to search for WiFi APs with high quality ranking in
the proximity of the user’s current location, so that the user
can plan the next move or choose a good meeting point with
friends. The crowdsensing mode allows a user who already
connects to a WiFi AP to rate the AP, according to the actual
experience of using the AP, through the user’s smartphone.
Both modes require users’ location information: the query
mode needs to know the location of the user in order to search
for nearby APs, and the crowdsensing mode also needs to
obtain the user’s location together with the associated WiFi
AP quality information.
However, if the back-end system is not trustworthy or
properly designed, the sensitive information of users may be
disclosed to adversaries. Specifically, we consider two types
of privacy threats in this work: activity hotspot disclosure and
activity transition disclosure. A user’s activity hotspots are
the locations or places she stays for a long time or frequently
visits, such as home, office, and her favorite cafe. A user’s
activity transition is the moving sequence that connects all the
user’s activity hotspots.
Conventionally, the countermeasures to privacy threats can
be classified into three categories: (1) anonymization, (2)
obfuscation, and (3) encryption. Anonymization is to “disiden-
tify” a user by, for example, reporting additional locations
(typically of other users) together with the user’s location. Ob-
fuscation is to report a “modified” version instead of the real
location of a user. Encryption exploits cryptographic methods
to conduct security key encryption and decryption between
front-end clients and back-end servers. The first and second
countermeasures are performed at front-end clients whereas
the third relies on collaboration between front-end clients and
back-end servers. In this paper, we combine anonymization
(a) Activity pattern of user 1 
with lower coverage and 
lower uniformity.
Coverage=0.288;
Uniformity=0.744;
Privacy Exposure=0.786.
(b) Activity pattern of user 2 
with higher coverage and 
higher uniformity.
Coverage=1;
Uniformity=0.821;
Privacy Exposure=0.179.
(c) Activity pattern of user 3 
with higher coverage and 
lower uniformity.
Coverage=0.992;
Uniformity=0.736;
Privacy Exposure=0.269.
Fig. 3. Privacy exposure for three users each with 1000 activity points
(marked as black dots), where the blue circle is the smallest disc enclosing
the 1000 activity points.
and obfuscation approaches so that front-end sensing clients
have full control over the reported data in order to protect user
privacy.
B. The Privacy Exposure Problem
This work sets out to answer the following two questions:
(1) how to quantify privacy exposure for a given set of data
submitted by a certain user and (2) how to effectively reduce
privacy exposure. Note that the “data” here is location-tagged.
Assume that each user has a unique user account in the system
(this could be for the rewarding purpose in order to encourage
user participation and improve trustworthiness [23][24]). Let Ω
denote the set of reports in the WiFi advisory system. Let ri =
(wi, li, ai, si, qi, fi) denote the i-th report, where wi is the ID
of the WiFi access point that the smartphone is associated
with, li is the location of the smartphone, ai is the positioning
accuracy (e.g., obtained from Google localization API), si is
the signal strength received by the smartphone, qi is the link
quality (i.e., link speed) observed by the smartphone, and fi is
the set of ambient visible WiFi access points observed by the
smartphone. Note that each report is submitted to the system
when the smartphone is under either the query mode or the
crowdsensing mode.
Given a set of reports {r1, r2, . . . , rn} submitted by a par-
ticular user, we define privacy exposure based on the following
two concepts: (1) activity coverage (or “coverage” for short)
and (2) activity uniformity (or “uniformity” for short). The
former refers to the location range of the user’s all activities,
while the latter refers to how uniform the user moves within
the above range.
Definition 1: Given a set of reports {r1, r2, . . . , rn} sub-
mitted by a particular user, the activity coverage is defined
as
λ({r1, r2, . . . , rn}) = D
Dmax
,
where D is the diameter of the smallest circle covering all the
reports and Dmax is a normalizing constant no smaller than
D, such that 0 ≤ λ({r1, r2, . . . , rn}) ≤ 1.
Finding the value of D for a given set of reports is a
classic smallest enclosing disc problem [25], to which there
are many approximation algorithms as solutions. However,
the computational complexity of these approximation algo-
rithms does not suit smartphones. Therefore, for a practi-
cal implementation, we approximate this diameter as D =
min{Dmax, 2 ×max{d(
∑n
i=1 li
n , lj)|j = 1, 2, . . . , n}}, where
d(
∑n
i=1 li
n , lj) is the distance between the center of gravity of
all the reports’ locations and the location lj . Fig. 3 gives an
example of 1000 activity points for 3 different users. Fig. 3(a)
shows that the activity pattern of user 1 has lower coverage
compared to the user in Fig. 3(b).
Definition 2: Given a set of reports {r1, r2, . . . , rn} sub-
mitted by a particular user, the activity uniformity is defined
as
U({r1, r2, . . . , rn}) =
[
∑
i 6=j d(li, lj)]
2(
n
2
) ·∑i 6=j d2(li, lj) .
The uniformity U is the equilibrium level of all the distances
between each pair of reports and is defined using Jain’s
fairness index [26]; its value 0 ≤ U({r1, r2, . . . , rn}) ≤ 1.
Now we can define define privacy exposure based on the
coverage and uniformity defined above.
Definition 3: Given a set of reports {r1, r2, . . . , rn} sub-
mitted by a particular user, the privacy exposure of the user
is defined as
Ψ({r1, r2, . . . , rn}) =
1− λ({r1, r2, . . . , rn}) · U({r1, r2, . . . , rn}). (1)
Therefore, a lower coverage or a lower uniformity results in a
higher privacy exposure, while a lower exposure is preferred.
Also, 0 ≤ Ψ({r1, r2, . . . , rn}) ≤ 1. Fig. 3(b) shows that the
activity pattern of user 2 has higher uniformity compared with
the user in Fig. 3(c).
Thus, we have answered the first question, i.e., how to
quantify the privacy exposure for a given set of reports
submitted by a particular user. To answer the second question,
i.e., how to reduce privacy exposure when the user needs to
make location-based queries or submit location-tagged reports,
we define the privacy exposure problem, taking a divide-and-
conquer approach.
Definition 4: Given a crowdsourced dataset Ω from all the
users and the set of reports {r1, r2, . . . , rn} submitted by a
particular user, the privacy exposure problem is to determine,
for a new report r sensed by this user: (1) whether it is
necessary to submit the new report r and (2) how to cloak
this report to minimize privacy exposure if the submission is
necessary.
IV. A PRIVACY-PRESERVING SENSING ALGORITHM
In this section, we design a dual-mode sensing algorithm
to solve the above-defined privacy exposure problem. We
differentiate user locations (activity hotspots) between private
places and non-private places. The private places refer to a
user’s “long-term stay” places, such as home and office. The
non-private places refer to “short-term stay” points of interest
(PoIs) that are frequently visited by the user, such as her
favorite cafes. Both places should not be directly submitted
Place detection:
Is it a private 
place?
k-anonymity mode
Yes
No
Sensing control
Skip the data
Location-embedded data
Place learning
Submit k reports
Place-aware mode
Yes
No
The user is 
making a query
The user is 
constributing a report
Is it a location-
based query?
Fig. 4. Workflow of our privacy-preserving sensing algorithm.
without control, which may otherwise lead to lower coverage
and lower uniformity, and hence higher privacy exposure.
Our dual-mode sensing algorithm is illustrated in Fig. 4.
Each smartphone operates in one of the two modes, place-
aware mode and k-anonymity mode, when holding a location-
tagged report subject to possible submission. If the user is in a
private place, the smartphone will operate in the place-aware
mode which will skip all the location-tagged data. Otherwise,
the smartphone operates in the k-anonymity mode which will
choose k − 1 additional reports to submit together with the
original report.
A. Place Learning and Detection in Place-aware Mode
We exploit the network fingerprint-based place learning and
detection [27] to determine if a smartphone should submit its
sensed location-embedded data. Each smartphone maintains
the WiFi fingerprints of the user’s private place profile P .
Initially, P = ∅. When the user’s smartphone senses location-
embedded data in an unknown place at time t, it starts to
learn the WiFi fingerprints of this unknown place, denoted
by pi = q(t), where q(t) = {w1, w2, . . . , wk} includes all the
visible WiFi BSSIDs at time t. The pi will be updated by pi =
pi∩q(t+1) at time t+1 incrementally if S(pi, q(t+1)) ≥ ∆,
where S(pi, q(t + 1)) =
|q(t+1)⋂ pi|
|pi| ∈ [0, 1] is the similarity
between the sensed location and the current WiFi fingerprints
of the private place pi, and ∆ is a configurable threshold.
Otherwise, if S(pi, q(t+ 1)) < ∆, it gives up pi as a private
place since the user is detected to have left pi. If pi 6= ∅ till
t + k where k > ∆L and ∆L is a configurable threshold,
P is updated as P = P ∪ {pi}, and the above learning
process continues. Furthermore, for each location sensed by
the smartphone at time t, the algorithm will also conduct the
place detection by calculating the similarity S(q(t), pj) for
each pj ∈ P . If there exists a pj ∈ P with S(q(t), pj) ≥ ∆,
then the user is in the private place pj and q(t) is discarded.
The aforementioned scheme of place learning and detection
is for submitting crowdsensed data as indicated in the right-
hand portion of Fig. 4. When submitting a query, on the other
hand, it will not enter the place-aware mode and the query
will be submitted anyway. However, the k-anonymity mode
will be activated to protect privacy as explained next.
B. Data Anonymization in k-anonymity Mode
In the k-anonymity mode, we exploit the k-anonymity tech-
nique [20] to choose k−1 additional reports to submit together
with the real report in order to reduce privacy exposure. Our
algorithm consists of two phases: anonymization phase and
obfuscation phase. The anonymization phase determines the
extra k − 1 reports, and the obfuscation phase modifies the
original report to avoid giving away the user’s exact location.
1) Anonymization phase: Let Φ denote the k-anonymity
set which will be submitted by the smartphone. When
the smartphone senses a new report denoted by rj =
(wj , lj , aj , sj , qj , fj), the k-anonymity set is initialized
as Φ = {rj}. Then our algorithm will update Φ
iteratively until |Φ| = k, as follows.
a) Each smartphone will maintain, or retrieve from
server, two subsets of reports denoted by C and
C = Ω − C, respectively, where C is the set
of reports already submitted by the current user’s
smartphone and C is the set of reports submitted
by other users in the system. Note that since Ω is a
crowdsourced dataset contributed by all of users in
the mobile LBS, each user’s smartphone can only
differentiate C from C but cannot know the linkage
between other users and their reports.
b) If C 6= φ, the smartphone will select a report
rp = arg min
r∈C
Ψ(Φ
⋃
{r})
where Ψ(·) is defined in (1).
c) Otherwise, select a report rq ∈ C whose location
appears in C for the minimum number of times.
d) Update Φ = Φ
⋃{rp}.
e) Repeat (b)–(d) until |Φ| = k.
2) Obfuscation phase: Given the real report rj =
(wj , lj , aj , sj , qj , fj), find lPoI (e.g., via the Google
Place API [28]) which is the nearest point of interest
to lj , and update replace lj = lPoI .
V. SIMULATION
A. Simulation Setup
We conduct extensive simulations to examine our proposed
metric of privacy exposure defined in Section III and to
evaluate our algorithm outlined in Section IV. First, we
simulate different activity patterns to see how activity patterns
affect the values of coverage, uniformity, and privacy exposure.
Then, we compare our k-anonymity mode against a random k-
anonymity (“random” for short) and a naive (“naive” for short)
sensing algorithm to investigate the performance. The random
k-anonymity sensing algorithm chooses the k − 1 redundant
reports randomly, and the naive sensing algorithm submits
reports directly without any cloaking mechanism.
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Fig. 5. Uniform and beta distributions for generating activity patterns.
In our simulations, the experimental field is a circle with
diameter Dmax = 500 meters. The activity patterns of users
are generated by the uniform and beta distributions in Fig. 5,
where BD(α, β) denotes the beta distribution with shape
parameters of α and β. We consider the polar coordinate
system to generate activity points within the experimental
field, where each activity point is represented as a pair of
(γ, θ). Here, γ =
√
ρ× Dmax2 is the distance from the activity
point to the center of the experimental field, ρ ∈ [0, 1] is a
random number generated by the probability distributions in
Fig. 5, and θ = ρ× 2pi is the polar angle of the activity point.
Thus, a smaller value of α and a larger value of β will generate
activity points close to the center of the experimental field and
span a narrow angle in the experimental field. In this way, we
can generate non-uniform and dense cases of activity points
to study the proposed metrics. All the simulation results are
averaged over 100 runs.
B. Simulation Results
In the first set of simulations, we vary the number of
activity points of a single user from 0 to 1200 to study the
coverage, uniformity, and privacy exposure. Fig. 6(a) presents
the simulation results. As it can be seen, the coverage of
the activity points generated by the uniform distribution and
BD(5, 2) distribution are higher than others because their
radii of the smallest enclosing circles are close to the radius
of the experimental field. On the other hand, BD(2, 30)
results in lower coverage because its activity points are lo-
cated at an extremely small area around the center of the
experimental field. For uniformity, as shown in Fig. 6(b),
BD(30, 5) and BD(30, 30) have lower uniformity because
both distributions generate activity points within a ring-belt
area along the boundary of the experimental field. Finally,
for privacy exposure as shown in Fig. 6(c), we see that the
uniform distribution has the lowest privacy exposure while
the BD(2, 30) distribution has the highest. This implies that
coverage weighs more than uniformity in privacy exposure,
which conforms to our intuition. Thus, this set of simulations
demonstrate that our proposed privacy exposure is a sensible
metric to evaluate user privacy in the spatial domain as users
who have a larger activity coverage, and more uniform activity
points will have a better (lower) privacy exposure.
An additional observation is that the privacy exposure does
not improve when the number of activity points is larger
than 200. This is because the activity points generated in the
beginning are “representative” points that largely determine
the coverage, uniformity, and privacy exposure.
In the second set of simulations, we compare our k-
anonymity mode against the random and the naive sensing
algorithms. We uniformly generate Ω with 1000 reports in
the experimental field. In the simulation, we consider a single
user who will sequentially submit 100 real reports using our
k-anonymity mode with k = 10, where the activity points
of the user are generated by BD(5, 30) and BD(30, 30)
distributions, respectively. We choose these two distributions
because BD(5, 30) will generate activity points within a small
area closer to the center of the experimental field while
BD(30, 30) will generate activity points within a ring-belt
area along the boundary of the experimental field. Fig. 7 gives
the result, where for each submitted new report, we trace
the changes in coverage, uniformity, and privacy exposure.
Figs. 7(a)-(b) and Figs. 7(d)-(e) show that our algorithm leads
to higher coverage and higher uniformity than the random and
the naive sensing algorithms. This is because of the judicious
choice of the k−1 additional data in our algorithm to achieve
the lowest privacy exposure. In Fig. 7(c) and Fig. 7(f), our
algorithm improves privacy exposure by 74.9% and 68.5%,
respectively, as compared to the naive sensing algorithm at
the end of the simulation. On the other hand, the privacy
exposure of the random sensing algorithm is closer to the result
of ours when the simulations terminate. This is because when
the number of submitted reports increases, the random sensing
algorithm will gradually improve the coverage and approach
the performance of our algorithm. However, it is important
to note that our algorithm has optimized both coverage and
uniformity even in the very beginning when there are only
few user activity points. Thus, our algorithm allows users to
submit location-tagged reports without significantly exposing
privacy for any user activity patterns.
VI. IMPLEMENTATION
A. Setup
We have implemented our dual-mode sensing algorithm
in WiFi-Scout [4], an Android-based mobile application that
provides location-based service using crowdsourced WiFi-
quality reports. For the place-aware mode, we set the learning
duration ∆L = 1 hour and the threshold of place detection
∆ = 0.2. For the k-anonymity mode, we set k = 30 and
Dmax = 50 kilometers which is the longest distance from
the east-most Singapore to the west-most Singapore. When a
smartphone connects to a WiFi access point, it will start to
submit WiFi-quality reports every 40 minutes in the format
mentioned in Section III-B. The WiFi-Scout crowdsourced
dataset is downloaded from the WiFi-Scout back-end server
when the mobile application is first launched. We conduct
two experiments to study how our algorithm affects privacy
exposure and how human mobility patterns affect privacy
exposure. The duration of the experiment is one week.
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Fig. 6. Comparison of (a) coverage, (b) uniformity, and (c) privacy exposure for different activity patterns.
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Fig. 7. Comparison of coverage, uniformity, and privacy exposure for different algorithms. In our k-anonymity algorithm and random, k = 10. The activity
points in (a)-(c) are generated by BD(5, 30) and the activity points in (d)-(f) are generated by BD(30, 30).
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Fig. 8. Experimental results: (a) 34 real reports submitted by user 1’s smartphone 1 running the naive sensing algorithm, where coverage=0.184,
uniformity=0.515, and privacy exposure=0.905; (b) 60 reports inclusive of 2 real reports (k = 30) submitted by user 1’s smartphone 2 running our sensing
algorithm, where coverage=1.0, uniformity=0.745, and privacy exposure=0.255; (c) 240 reports inclusive of 8 real reports submitted by user 2’s smartphone
running our sensing algorithm, where coverage=1.0, uniformity=0.759, and privacy exposure=0.241; (d) 240 reports inclusive of 8 real reports submitted by
user 3’s smartphone running our sensing algorithm, where coverage=0.729, uniformity=0.787, and privacy exposure=0.426.
B. Experimental Results
First, we compare our algorithm against the naive sensing
algorithm which submits reports straight without any cloaking
when the smartphone connects to WiFi. In this experiment,
a single user carries two smartphones to collect data, where
smartphone 1 is running the naive sensing algorithm and
smartphone 2 is running our algorithm. Figs. 8(a)-(b) show
the results, where the green markers stand for the real reports
and the red marker stand for the extra redundant reports
selected from the WiFi-Scout crowdsourced dataset using our
k-anonymity mode. As it can be seen, the reports submitted by
smartphone 1 result in an extreme high privacy exposure and
the user’s activity hotspots are exposed straight since there
is no place learning and detection to avoid exposing long-
stay points and the submitted reports are not cloaked. Note
that smartphone 2 submits only 2 real reports since it learns
the user’s private points and further avoids submitting reports
when the user stays in these private points. Compared with the
naive sensing algorithm, our algorithm successfully hides the
activity hotspots and improves the privacy exposure by 71.8%.
In the second experiment, we consider three users with
different mobility patterns to see how human mobility affects
privacy exposure. We select the three users based on their
mobility diversity in the spatial domain and discuss if our
algorithm can cloak the privacy-sensitive information of users
who have seldom mobility. User 1 and user 2 have less
mobility, and their activity hotspots are located at west and east
Singapore, respectively, and the mobility of user 3 is high as
she travels around the whole Singapore. As shown in Fig. 8(b),
Fig. 8(c), and Fig. 8(d), the reports submitted by user 1, user
2, and user 3 result in privacy exposure of 0.255, 0.241, and
0.426, respectively. This clearly shows that our proposed al-
gorithm effectively reduces privacy exposure through cloaking
users’ activity hotspots and activity transitions, and this can
be achieved even at low user-mobility levels.
VII. CONCLUSION
This paper addresses two privacy threats, namely activity
hotspot disclosure and activity transition disclosure, for mobile
LBSs. We have proposed a metric to quantify privacy exposure
which incorporates activity coverage and activity uniformity
to evaluate the privacy exposing levels given a set of user
location-tagged data. We have also defined a privacy exposure
problem and proposed a privacy-preserving algorithm to min-
imize the exposure of activity hotspots and activity transitions
of users. We have implemented our algorithm both in a
simulation program and on an Android-based WiFi advisory
system, and carried out experiments in the real world. Both
simulation and experimental results demonstrate that (1) the
proposed metric of privacy exposure can properly characterize
different user activity patterns and (2) the proposed algorithm
can effectively reduce privacy exposure by cloaking users’
activity hotspots and activity transitions.
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